In memoriam Jean-Luc Nancy. Jean-Luc Nancy: a Sharing of the In-Conductible CRISTIANA CIMINO 24 September 2021 PHILOSOPHY JEAN-LUC NANCY Still from Lenz au musée (Lenz in the museum), a concert-fiction by Rodolphe Burger featuring Jean-Luc Nancy, 2021. In memoriam Jean-Luc Nancy. This text was first published under the title "Per Jean-Luc Nancy" in the European Journal of Psychoanalysis. https://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/per-jean-luc-nancy-2/ It rarely happens, after adolescence and early youth, that an encounter with a thought leaves traces that make a difference in one's way of thinking and with which one never stops coming to terms with, whether one wants to or not. When I was young it happened to me with Freud, with Lacan, with Foucault and I could name others. As an adult, with Fachinelli and Derrida. Certainly, with Jean-Luc Nancy. I have always had the idea that some forms of thought are so powerful because they have passed through the flesh of those inhabited by them, like an awe that becomes a necessity. Nancy, since 1992, had been a 'transplant', that is, he had undergone a heart transplant. It was he who, in the wake of Derrida and, if possible, even more radicalised, had made the stranger and his unexpected and uninvited arrival, the unannounced arriver, one of his most cherished themes. This experience gave birth to L'intrus (2000), a short and impressive book in which the stranger becomes an intruder precisely in order not to risk losing his extraneousness, with all the ambiguities of the case. And he had the intruder sewn into his chest. It is hard to imagine a more effective contingency (a perfect storm, one might say) to describe a thought and its inseparable practice. The extraneousness to one's own identity, the vain saying "I" because I already am-is elsewhere, the open closed being, are embodied in an incision that holds the intruder inside, a body alien to thought itself and extraneousness that reveals itself "at the heart" of what should be more familiar. This extraneousness, this 'permanent regime of intrusion', puts him in touch with himself, writes the transplanted Nancy. Nancy is considered, among many other things, the philosopher "of the body". In fact, he wrote not about the body but, as he himself liked to say, bodies: naked bodies, foreign bodies, bodies enjoyed, bodies exposed. In writing about the body, it is not a question, according to him, of signifying it but of reaching it, of touching it. He writes in Corpus (1995), a cryptic, poetic and totally disorienting text, about the limit between meaning and flesh (of the body), where nothing passes, it is precisely there that one touches. To touch is to not penetrate what is impenetrable, exiled from any possibility of union (in Lacanian terms one would say: there is no sexual relationship), irretrievably partial. Like our existence itself, after all, which has in the body its only support, indeed, bodies are the very act of existence, being, writes Nancy, in this apparently close to the late Lacan, the one who insists on the One of jouissance , the last bastion of significations. Yet Nancy has always been suspicious and critical of psychoanalysis and Lacanianism and, perhaps precisely for this reason he questions them, as Derrida also did. Suspicious because even the very ambition to signify (as far as one can or wants to) is, in fact, an arbitrariness, a violence (which is completely true, psychoanalytically speaking) that wants to tame the intruder. He is wary of bodies that are too 'signified', of hysterical bodies, bodies that would instead be blocked by the continuous transmission of meaning (the symptom itself), expropriated by their free floating out of sense; he claims a body that is exposed to that continuous effraction of meaning that life simply constitutes. He accuses Lacan of exercising "catastrology" by inscribing himself in a tradition that articulates desire to lack and affirms the "there is" of sexual intercourse, in opposition to Lacanian enunciation, entrusting bodies and their incidental touching and enjoyment with the only love to aspire to ( L'"il y a" du rapport sexuel , 2000). The "not" is already a property of the relationship, it refers to some substance, to a unity that shelters the unsustainable void that opens up between (the bodies). Nancy's perspective summons us to a presence that does not look elsewhere than at the body of the other and at our own, equally foreign, and to that between which is so important. Bodies that touch and enjoy in an always precarious balance, touching and measuring limits without pretending to violate or ignore them. Will the renunciation of rapacity in favour of moving along that between, which is always a threshold, an edge, lead to the discovery of a real otherness in whatever form it presents itself (body of: human animal, non-human animal, woman, migrant, etc.)? Nancy seems to hope so, or rather, he thinks it is the only way that will save us from a catastrophe. It does not seem so adventurous to say that we find something of Seminar XX here, even if Nancy seems not only convinced that we have to talk about what we cannot talk about, but in his own way even more determined to make practicable a sharing of the in-conductible (which does not merge, does not unite), assuming extraneousness as something beyond which there is nothing but extraneousness itself. Related Articles Jean-Luc Nancy: who desperately sought Aurore FRANÇOIS WARIN Read Article Jean-Luc Nancy: Opening the meaning of finitude. DAVID ZERBIB Read Article

YANN GOUPIL After a professional career in art education and teaching (in particular, specialised art teaching in high schools), Yann Goupil is currently a lecturer at the Université Sorbonne Nouvelle where he leads a seminar on the thought of the image within the Master Didactique of the image, art of transmission. He is also coordinator at the ENS of the activities of the CIEPFC (Centre international d'étude de la philosophie française contemporaine) with Anne Simon, in charge of the centre and the PhilOfr research notebook. In this context, he has opened a research seminar entitled Jean-Luc Nancy à l'atelier: un art inédit d'être au monde (Jean-Luc Nancy in the studio: an original art of being in the world), which takes up the title and motif of his doctoral research in philosophy at the Université Jean Jaurès de Toulouse within ERRaPhis, a research project associated with the Savoirs praxis et poïétiques en art . La poussée 23 August 2022 Read Article

STÉPHANE HABIB Stéphane Habib est psychanalyste et philosophe. Il dirige l'Institut des Hautes Etudes en Psychanalyse et y anime un séminaire de philosophie et psychanalyse. Il est membre de l'Institut Hospitalier de Psychanalyse de Sainte-Anne, à Paris, ainsi que du comité de rédaction de la revue Tenou'a . Habib est l'auteur de La responsabilité chez Sartre et Levinas (Préface de Catherine Chalier), L'Harmattan (1998), Levinas et Rosenzweig - Philosophies de la révélation , P.U.F., (2005), La langue de l'amour , Hermann, 2016, Faire avec l'impossible - Pour une relance du politique, (Préface de Delphine Horvilleur et Postface de Paul Audi) Hermann (2017), et Il y a l'antisémitisme, Les Liens qui Libèrent (2020). Levinas après-coup – avant-propos : 25 ans de la mort d’Emmanuel Levinas 24 February 2021 Read Article

CRISTIANA CIMINO Cristiana Cimino is a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst with a Freudian and Lacanian training. She is full member of the Italian Psychoanalytic Society (IPA). She is member of Istituto Elvio Fachinelli (ex ISAP). She has been co-editor of the European Journal of Psychoanalysis and is a member of the editorial board of Vestigia . She has published several texts on specialized journals, in various languages. She is the author of Il discorso amoroso . Dall’amore della madre al godimento femminile ( Roma, Manifestolibri, 2015); Tra la vita e la morte. La psicoanalisi scomoda, Manifestolibri, 2920. She practices in Rome.

If the concept of history and the history of philosophy constructed under it are contaminated by geo-politics then that philosophy must be allowed to end. We also find that this history of philosophy is continuous with the selection of thematics, concepts and concerns which were at first theological. And the Beginning of Philosophy SHAJ MOHAN 15 July 2021 PHILOSOPHY Library of Ashurbanipal; Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons If the concept of history and the history of philosophy constructed under it are contaminated by geo-politics then that philosophy must be allowed to end. We also find that this history of philosophy is continuous with the selection of thematics, concepts and concerns which were at first theological. To begin philosophy again is to open ourselves to the fundamental philosophical experience, the obscure experience, which was surrendered to religion because religion controlled the end of the world. This beginning will also require that we discard classical logic and the law of identity for new faculties. 1 There is the love of philosophy. It is neither the love that someone may have for philosophy (today we call them “philosophy fans” or “philofans”) nor is it the love that the philosopher has for wisdom. It is the love erupting in philosophy: It is the love that philosophy has to give. Philosophy’s love. To begin again from another beginning, of which we knew intimately in our hearts as often as it skipped a beat, is to relieve the love of philosophy so that it may now do its work. This love is not the self-love of identity, faith, charity, and philia. The love of philosophy moves with lust, the loose, the spreading, the exploding. The other lust, the other beginning which has already loosened itself, multiplied, and has arrived at you, has now risen in you by becoming your love, your anastasis . As you may see, the familiar—P is P, P and Q, P or Q and its old and current variants—will morally confine you with their self-love, and keep you away from this lust; this lust, it is more rigorous with its formalities which far exceed the classical notions of formality. This has to be explored with a heart, it must explode within a heart, explode as hearts, which can rise with the explosions of the stars and fall into the quiet lakes which mirror the movement of the skies—that is, your heart. This love is not given from a soil—the soil which smells of the blood of Achilles, or Karna, or Salahuddin, or Tomoe Gozen, or Spotted Elk. It is not given from illogical geo-political determinations—west and east, and north and south. This love is repelled by national philosophies and the latter with their self-identifying self-love have no other terror than this love, this lust, this wanderlust of man, which we witness now at all borders. This lust, this loosening, this seizure of hearts, your heart’s rush comes from a non-place—the internet. The other beginning has no land, no flag, no blood, no soil. It is not planted, it is loose, it lets, it lets loose, it lusts. It is the loosening of philosophy. It is the lust for freedom. It is the lust of freedom. In this text of Jean-Luc Nancy we experience this love. In this difficult text — O Jean-Luc, how difficult! —we are asked to reconsider the now familiar love for philosophy as opposed to national philosophical movements (which are entwined with regional fascisms) and from philosophy as entertainment, something we consume in the series of internet memes, funny videos, and pornography of all kinds. Instead, there is rage. It explodes like Christ in the temple kicking and whipping away the usurpers of the space of the divine. Through that reference we must also indicate that it is time. The hours—not an identical moment, not simultaneity, as we will see—have arrived. 2 Nancy’s text encloses one of the most difficult of texts of Heidegger “End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (the difficulty is due to the political indecision in this text, concerning the ‘vocation’ of the geo-political invention called ‘the west’) within quotation marks, as if to guard us from its premises and conclusions, while opening the thought of the other beginning from within this text of Heidegger, and that which lies beyond its scope as Nancy had shown a long time ago. Nancy also suggests the other current in Heidegger’s corpus, which was published in recent decades, concerning the “other beginning” and its conditions. The conditions of the other beginning of philosophy in Heidegger lead to the text On Time and Being which is difficult due to a different order of reasons: It institutes a break with the logic derived from ontological difference for another logic, which Heidegger refused to develop beyond its ties to the principle of identity. In metaphysics, a difference is a difference in another, and in this sense the difference between Being and beings is without the third in which Being would separate from beings. This strange difference should either close in on beings for the oblivion of Being, or it should augment in such a way that at the limit of the difference two distinct kinds appear. Or, they disappear together as Nietzsche said. From here onwards we should engage with a few moments of certain philosophical texts scattered across time. These texts too wander, they too lust for the redemption of love. That is, they must not be thought of as confined to a history of philosophy which for Heidegger was the primary item of the geo-political project of ‘the west’. We should also think together in a wanderlust without surrendering to the temptations of other regional configurations—sciences and poetry—or nationalistic temptations, which include both the surviving vestiges of the projects of ‘the west’ and the newly assertive obscene stances of ‘the east’. That is, we wander, and we let loose that which is the love of philosophy and let it break through the borders and migration counters. Heidegger produced various determinations of metaphysics. In an early text “What Is Metaphysics” Heidegger would present metaphysics as the kind of thinking which at its very inception, the inception of each individual metaphysical act, brings into view the whole of metaphysics and of beings while setting the metaphysician into question. In this manner, in that text, the nothing (better understood as the voluptuousness of all things in their polynomia) approaches the questioner as the things (better understood as that which has been determined as that particular thing, or a functional isolation) recede from the questioner. The experience of polynomia gives way to the most metaphysical of experiences for Heidegger, the angst, which is also listlessness, as opposed to lust. Christ expulses money changers, Caravaggio, 1610; Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons In the text under consideration—within the text of Jean-Luc Nancy—and what its title refers to, the “End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” of Heidegger, the determination of metaphysics is something different. It shows us the loss of a lust, a wanderlust which was short changed for something poorer—the geo-political dominance of a region, which as we know, for Heidegger comes through in the sense of ‘the volk’. There is then a journey of the meanings of metaphysics inside Heidegger’s corpus itself. It begins with (1) the “pre-ontological understanding of Being” which belongs to the “Dasein” as its essence; (2) the experience of listlessness—“all things and human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference”—against the revelation of the polynomia of things; (3) and finally, the identification of philosophy with what Heidegger conceived as “metaphysics”, which in turn was identified with “the west”. For Heidegger, the end of philosophy was the beginning of the reign “the world civilization that is based upon Western European thinking” (1) The dominance of the west is not a cheerful development for Heidegger; it is, in fact, the very privation of Being itself, if something like that can be thought easily. At the same time is it not the gesture of false humility through which the fundamental decisions of humanity get reserved into “the west”? This question too is at stake in ‘the end of philosophy’. Now, this geo-political conclusion of Heidegger and its hidden intentions should have been questioned a long while ago, but perhaps it did not appear to be ‘so funny’ when it was originally published. In all these determinations of the essence of metaphysics place and soil play an important role for Heidegger. We know of the soil texts and the recently published notebooks. Soil for him is not only the soil of the volk who dwell in the regularity afforded by it, but it is also the soil of metaphysics. But for now, let us recall the introduction Heidegger wrote for “What Is Metaphysics” in 1949, where taking the arboreal analogy of Descartes – Philosophy is the tree of which metaphysics is the root, physics the trunk, all the other sciences are branches – he would remark that the roots give themselves “after a fashion, to the element of the soil” which is the truth of Being. When we attend to this “history of metaphysics” which is also “the history of the west” we should understand what history is for Heidegger. History is intimately connected to the soil. The soil is the soil of Being if it is taken by the volk who make it the locus to grow and let it grow with them. This growth, to take his example, of the soil of the Balkan region taken by wars which propelled growth and wars, is the soil with a history. As he explains in a text from the Nazi period, ‘“making history” means: first to create the space and soil ”’, where we find the sense of “to create space” resonating with “living room”. However, we come to know something more in these texts about history. Not all human beings can have history, of the growing relation with the attendant strife which is nourished by the soil, and which in turn nourishes the soil. Those who lack history are the ones who are not “volk” properly, and are inept at creating space and soil through capture and wars, there are human beings and human groups (Negros like, for example, Kaffirs) who have no history [...] however, animal and plant life has a thousand year long and eventful history [...] within the human region, history can be missing, as with Negros. (2) In the corpus of Heidegger, despite its many formal articulations of metaphysics, there is rarely an illuminating formal determination of history; that is, history is the tree rooted in a soil which belongs to those volk who capture it, own it, and it in turn nourishes them while this tree (arbour leads etymologically to “growth”) develops branches out of the trajectories of contestations. That is, history and “the west” are forever implicated in this racialisation of a provincial sort of gossip. Therefore, we will not carry this burden over from here. This has to be explored with a heart, it must explode within a heart, explode as hearts, which can rise with the explosions of the stars and fall into the quiet lakes which mirror the movement of the skies—that is, your heart. However, we will return to the formalism of the relation to Being in Heidegger, the gravity of his warnings, and the limitations of these warnings later. Further, it should be apparent that we do not accept today this meaning of history; we do not accept this history of philosophy; and we will not be concerned anymore with the end of such a geo-political tale of philosophy. And, soon we will find the reasons of metaphysics according to which this tale of philosophy is still poor. 3 Then, it is time again to ask the question “what is philosophy”? As Gilles Deleuze remarked, it is a question one asks in old age. When Deleuze asked it, he was not that old. He too was thinking of the old age of philosophy; philosophy in its old age asks itself—for it can ask nobody else— what is philosophy ? It is another matter that Deleuze assumed the posture of indifference to the “end of philosophy” discussions and to “deconstruction”. But we are not concerned with history and philosophy as geo-political instruments. We are letting lose, the lust of philosophy. We don’t have to borrow “the other beginning” from Heidegger, which will then be a geriatric gesture as per that sense of history which we left behind. Instead, we experience this birth as the love which summons freedom, the lust which scatters the listlessness. We begin again, on the non-soil of a non-nation, in the world of everyone and no one, philosophy as the giving of love according to its relation to that which is obscure—there is something, and that we are obscure ourselves. (3) However, for this occasion (because we will find other occasions together, and accordingly, we will account differently) we should account for what it was that came to be called philosophy in a constricting and consolidated manner since Heidegger. There are certain early tendencies in the formal organisation of thinking which was concerned with everything which appeared in a region, which is not Greece. The Greeks never knew themselves as Greeks. As far as we know, pending archaeological discoveries, these formal thinkers who gave principles to the thinking of everything appeared from Turkey, Northern Africa, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, and generally the Mediterranean region. We should note here that we still don’t know sufficiently about the formal thoughts and metaphysical inventions of other regions of the world, which we had been evaluating on the basis of a restricted understanding of philosophy and a geo-political history of philosophy; in recent decades, on the basis of a Heideggerian syllabus. Native American Chief Spotted Elk lies dead after the massacre of Wounded Knee, 1890; Image credit: Wikimedia Commons Of these thinkers, for certain reasons Plato and Aristotle came to be held up as the points of origin of all thinking concerning philosophy and the construction of its history. The most important reason is the survival of their texts which in turn is related to their adaptability into religions – Christianity and Islam – which took control of life and thought in these regions. One cannot easily imagine Epicurus, Lucretius, and Zeno the Phoenician being adopted by either Islam or Christianity. Instead, Epicureanism made its appearance in the region now called Europe during the period known as renaissance. What came to be constituted as “west” and “western philosophy” in the 19th century was already prepared by this first syllabus of the philosophical selections of the Islamic and then the Christian theologians. This hour is the urgent beginning; we should come to details of this tale and the implications it had for the development of various formalities in philosophy and the sciences on another occasion. 4 The primary conditions of philosophy in “western philosophy” are to be found not in the pronouncements of Parmenides’ poem on the unity of being and thought, which we came to understand through Aristotle, and then Heidegger, but rather in the metaphysics of Aristotle, which closely follows the questions opened by Plato’s Parmenides (The One).As we know, logic is not concerned with questions, such “what is sorrow?”, “who is Mudimbe?”, “Why is there something?” Logic is concerned with any P whatsoever, which is how it claims its universality; that is, without being a discipline which enquires into the distinctions between the general, the specific and the individual it calculates the terms and relations which come to it determined in advance. However, logic would come to be the ground of metaphysics from the Middle Ages. According to the early Wittgenstein, logic, which is also our common place wisdom today, sends these questions to the sciences. Classically, ontology is the discipline concerned with the meaning of something. The answer to the question “what is x?” is never given in terms of that thing, but in terms of some other thing, or that which is said of the thing in our consideration, and these answers lead to the meaning of meaning itself, which, we insist, must mean something. In a certain sense ontology is the common place activity which everyone practices. However, as the activity of thinking which refers everything to that which is said of everything is not at all what is being called ontology today. Today, there is a careless distribution of ‘ontologies’ such as programming language ontologies, machine ontology, and computational ontology which are projected on to the level of what was called fundamental ontology. This activity can confuse thinking, but it can also create calamitous outcomes. The laws of thought follow from the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle who were responding to the obscure experience that the disappearance of the world itself is not anticipable, and it cannot be thought as an event. If logic presupposes a metaphysics according to which it receives terms and relations, this metaphysics remains Aristotelian. We can arrive at this metaphysics from different texts and different pathways of his corpus. But for this purpose, it is the text Metaphysics that is important. As we know, the concept of substance is that through which the unity of each thing experienced, which themselves vary within ranges, and they come and go. But that against which all substances and all kinds of substances achieve their unity, and the reason for this unity were offered by him in Metaphysics . The sciences return from time to time to metaphysics without having to read Metaphysics , for the problems of philosophy remain open to all those who think towards the obscure experience. The book Λ is where why things must have unity is discussed. Here, the question is of the world as that which sustains itself, it is presented as an assumed fact, which is the most difficult thought. Now, this question—the question of the obscure as we addressed it elsewhere—is not explored by him, instead we are told that there must be an eternity in which the world and the heavens are conserved, even while, individual substances enjoy their hours and pass away. Such eternity must have an outer boundary which protects the things of the world from passing into nothing through the dynamics of change. (All this concerns difficult arguments regarding motion or speed, to which we will have to come eventually). That which does not require another to be is a thought when this thought is a self-thinking thought. The unity of the self-thinking thought which does not require another is the god of Aristotle. The first mover, then, of necessity exists; and in so far as it is necessary, it is good, and in this sense a first principle [...] On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for a short time. (4) That is, the obscure experience of the un-anticipatable insistence of the world, or the non-event of, to use a phrase from Kant, “The End of All Things” is enclosed by the first total metaphysics that we know of, and identity is opened as the primary sense, let’s say, of Being. The familiar substance metaphysics alone is not sufficient to guarantee that the world and everything in it will not vanish in the lust of kinesis, and therefore the world needs that against which all changes find a measure—which is also immeasurable—such that we may have the experience that the threat of the disappearance of the world is brought under the orders of anticipation (which is the eschatology of religions); in other words, the self-thinking thought which is necessary in itself assures us that the world will remain through arrivals and passages of substances. The unity of all things, then, refers to the unity of the self which does not require another for this unity; or that which is without lust. Here, we can see the reasons why theologians would later find in Aristotle “The Philosopher”. However, this self-thinking and self-sufficient thought was still not enough for Christianity is another matter, for this thought, which is a pleasure to itself, which loves itself eternally, is not the creator of this order of the world. This world, for Aristotle, is eternal. For the distinction between the creator God and His creatures theologians would later introduce certain clever distinctions which were foreign to Aristotle, so that this new God would demand the love of his creatures and the creatures in turn will receive his love. The metaphysics of Aristotle founded on the unity of substances understands changes as the distribution of variations into two extremities. It set the beginnings of the logic of one and two in philosophy. It is from the answer to the question “How does the world sustain itself?” that the metaphysics and from it the classical laws of thought follow. This question, which we should ask again and again in other forms—“What guarantees the non-vanishing of this world?”—rarely took prominence in philosophical texts, despite the prominence gained by Aristotle in these histories. In other words, the experience of philosophy, the obscure experience, is not part of the history of philosophy as Heidegger (and other such geo-political determinations of philosophy) conceived it, due in part to the appropriation and theologisation of the end of all things by religion. Image Credit: University of Virginia Press There were other articulations of this question, and of this obscure experience, in the ancient world, from across the world, some of which would enter the sciences as fundamental principles. Let us recall that, Nietzsche was acutely aware of the sense of this question and the difference it has with the question “What is being?” That is, the question of Being was holding the gaze of philosophy away from “the abyss” of the obscure experience. Hence, he would wager that the answer to the question— How is it that we know in thought the remaining constant of the world as such? —through his eternal return of the same. That is, unlike the Aristotelian guarantor, for Nietzsche the world itself returns eternally. (5) These profound questions and concerns opened by philosophy—not merely Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s Metaphysics—were at first given over to theology and then to the sciences, who, often without being aware of it, are safekeeping these questions. In the meantime, philosophy would recede into the subject (the identity between the subject and the object) and later into meaning and culture when we came to Heidegger. Heidegger did question these subjectivisms and identity aggressively. While the ‘other’ relation Heidegger found with identity lies elsewhere, in an idyllic a priori constructed from out of a peasant life which repeated without variation across generations, it should not be forgotten that he opposed the very classical form of responsible thought which is founded on identity, the identity between thought and being, The relationship between thinking and being is sameness, identity. The title “Being and Thought” says, being and thought are identical. As if it were decided what identical means, as if the sense of identity lay at hand [...] (6) But was it sufficient? Did not identity insist in the structure of event of being? These questions too will have to be reserved for another occasion. To examine the meanings of identity here it would take an excursion into another theory of faculties for philosophy and then begin again and be seized by what is its provenance. This occasion is too brief to point out the other powers or faculties which are not classical, and we have addressed them in several texts. (7) 5 The laws of thought follow from the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle who were responding to the obscure experience that the disappearance of the world itself is not anticipable, and it cannot be thought as an event. The laws of thought can be represented as law of identity p = p; law of non-contradiction Not (p and not p); and law of excluded middle P or not P. Of these laws it is identity which is the constant between the two prominent formalisms of the laws of thought—intuitionist mathematics (its mathematicians are rare) which works without the third law and para-consistency without the second law. It is to be see whether there is a general theory of logic of which the familiar logics are special cases. The law of identity guided the investigation into the foundations of mathematics. The procedures of Gödel, which simulated a computer, which did not exist then, lead to computers and also computational thinking, and that remains the height of the achievement of the logic of identity which we found was derived from the metaphysical closure of the obscure experience. However critical Heidegger remained of identity it played a role in his thinking as that through which an other thinking which raised a theatre of contradictions and contraries played out in the clearing, while a different sense of identity, of the self-identical volk, would guide and contribute to the idyllic a priori of much of his thinking of history. But we should now come to ‘the end’ as it was for Heidegger and what it means for us. Heidegger’s examination of and practice of philosophy avoided many of the questions and problems which were once properly philosophical—space, plenum, matter, measure, polynomia—and were surrendered to the sciences and to what he dismissed as metaphysics. The deepening of the questioning of metaphysics appeared from another direction, which was the determination of Being as meaning itself, which does not mean anything—Being is not the name of Being, from which followed the insight that metaphysics is the drive which sought to make of the meaning of all meanings a particular meaning. The series of these names of being—Idea, Substance, Subject, Will—constitutes the history of metaphysics for Heidegger, which is a rather restrictive history. The formality of Heidegger’s early architectonic, of the difference, of Being is Platonic; if we take the shorthand third man argument to point it out it will not be inaccurate. The determination of Being or the naming of Being in each epoch has constituted with Being a difference which is generally termed as ontico-ontological difference. In metaphysics, a difference is a difference in another, and in this sense the difference between Being and beings is without the third in which Being would separate from beings. This strange difference should either close in on beings for the oblivion of Being, or it should augment in such a way that at the limit of the difference two distinct kinds appear. Or, they disappear together as Nietzsche said. Such eternity must have an outer boundary which protects the things of the world from passing into nothing through the dynamics of change. (All this concerns difficult arguments regarding motion or speed, to which we will have to come eventually). That which does not require another to be is a thought when this thought is a self-thinking thought. Whether Heidegger thought in terms of Genera and Species is another enquiry. Instead, we take this strange difference into considerations as it presents itself; or, understand it as Heidegger’s way of asking us to think the thought of the giving of meaning itself which is not a meaning in itself. For him, the acts of naming Being prevented us from thinking of meaning itself in the “history of metaphysics”. Metaphysics was, often forcefully, interpreted by Heidegger as the quest for the name of Being. But why this quest? Is it a matter of a ‘wicked heart’? Or is it a matter of not possessing the powers required to avoid this gesture? Is it due to the necessity to find names in order to transact with things, living and non-living? Is it due to his rejection (rather a silence about it) of the obscure experience which he might have thought as a problem of reason? But what is important is to see that each name of Being identifies and defines a world guided by that name. Of the series of names, a particular determination leads to the possibility that man may never name Being again; that is, when things appear as “standing reserve” the very act of naming enters the domain of relics, which is the end of the series of the names of Being. From the two ways of thinking of the difference of Being we found earlier, the becoming relic of Being is one of its possibilities. The “end of philosophy” coincides with the end of the naming of Being. Being shall no longer be called by man, and then man must think without Being. These ambiguities between the end of philosophy as the gathering of metaphysics which calls for another thinking and, at the same time, a helplessness in the face of the dominance of technology which has taken away the power to name Being from man, remain. The privation of the power to name Being perhaps prompted Heidegger to call for a silent thinking at the end, appropriate to ‘the end’. 6 We found with Aristotle that the form of thinking we recognise as metaphysics appeared against and as the answer to the most obscure and the most common of all experiences, which we termed the obscure experience . The theological and political conditions of the reception of philosophical texts (which persist even today) ensured, as we found earlier, the constitution of an early syllabus of philosophy, and through which a formal structure or organ of analysis of metaphysics of the kind deployed by Heidegger appeared. According to this received organ of analysis the most important question was “What is Being” What is the meaning of meaning? A self-defeating question. That which went into oblivion with Aristotle and Plato—the obscure experience—was displaced by Heidegger with a new oblivion which is of Being because for Heidegger the approximate relation to the obscure experience through the question “Why there is something?” belonged to the order of metaphysics. La Durée poignardée, René Magritte; Image Credit: Art Institute Chicago However, other beginnings and explosions of philosophy, without the conditions of loci and parental guidance of nation states existed. Often as what Derrida would call a bastard logics. The other beginning, a beginning which does not deny the polynomia of all things, while remaining open to the obscure experience as the common, which calls everyone to it without a care about language and soil, is our responsibility. But are we then without tradition, without analogies to port us, and without homologies to spring out of? No. We do have a tradition of our lustful explorations, provided we turn away from the poor philosophies which rely on an older logic, and look within and between texts of philosophy and the sciences, and the wanderlust of these texts. We are beginning. Therefore a few tastes will do, and each reaching to us from their own bastard logics. The earlier works of deconstruction by Derrida remained strictly within classical logic while revealing the limits of texts well determined in the classical sense; at these limits one could already glimpse the other philosophy, for differ a nce is neither word nor concept. In his final works a style of thinking emerged which was departing from classical logic, to the point that, echoing a Buddhist metaphysician from another place and time, that bastard Nagarjuna, Derrida would remark on the Khora of Plato—“One cannot even say of it that it is neither this nor that or that it is both this and that. It is not enough to recall that khora names neither this nor that, or, that khora says this or that”. (8) The important moments in this remark are “one cannot even say” and “it is not enough to recall” without which one can slip back into the distinct undecidable spaces of classical logic. Derrida brought this other logic or a bastard logic to bear on responsibility and politics. Contemporaneously, Jean-Luc Nancy published one of the most difficult texts from the point of view of classical thought and at the same time the most lucid of text from the bastard traditions, Sense of the World . Nancy addressed the same concerns we found earlier in Aristotle and later in Nietzsche, who are not the only custodians of this concern, while making a difference with Sartre on the relation between essence and existence, through resonance with a text of Aquinas—“On Being and Essence” which conducts itself as a commentary on Aristotle. Nancy’s text breaks away from that tradition to begin another thinking—“what is at stake will turn out to be this: existence precedes and succeeds on itself.” (9) Bernard Stiegler, who wrote passionately, absorbing the resources of the classical tradition, was also creating another tradition through the proliferation of references without care for regionalities and nationalities. Without continuing that lustful wandering of the world philosophy will appear to have finished itself today. Even while questioning the concepts, we find in Stiegler, an aggressive re-capture of the philosophical concerns and concepts from the sciences without the embarrassments and worries of his generation, because he was taking what was proper to philosophy. There are several other names to remember and gather into your traditions, your bastard traditions in this context. That will be soon. To recapitulate, the history of philosophy constructed by theology and geo-politics, which was received and transmitted by Heidegger as “the accomplishment” and the “the history of the west” is, without doubt, finished. We found that the restriction of philosophical questions and concepts to be entertained within that history, and also the conceding of much of philosophy to theology and the sciences, created an emaciated corpus of philosophy. That impoverished body of philosophy will not be able to fight the new wars against renewed fascisms, racisms, nationalisms, technological exuberance, and the tremendous challenge posed by climate crisis. Instead, we have now opened ourselves to the experience of philosophy, the obscure experience, and to a new practice of traditions which are always going to be bastard traditions. Thus, we begin: By discarding the philosophies which were derivative of a thought of identity (10) , which appeared by enshrouding the obscure experience, which includes the thought of being. We have begun from what was always the most common—the obscure experience. But we have only begun. We have begun, as it has been sufficiently indicated, a philosophical work which will not be of one, or of two. But everyone; philosophy as duty in politics. This work needs you. It calls for all hands on deck setting sail on a lustful sea to bring the love of philosophy to places which are without the orientation games of east and west, colour and tongues. Philosophy: To share in the redemption of love through the obscure experience. Love. Think. Love. Shaj Mohan, 13 July 2021 NOTES 1. “End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings . Edited by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993, p. 435. 2. Martin Heidegger, Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language , trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Una. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009, p. 69. 3. In order to avoid paraphrasing: “Since we don’t have much time I can sum it up as follows. We experience ourselves anticipating events in our lives, which often go on imperceptibly. For example, you are anticipating the end of this sentence while I am speaking and therefore you are listening. This can lead to satisfactions, surprises, and disappointments. But the end of the world, the total vanishing of the world, is never in our anticipation. We do not have the faculty for it. Instead, the impossibility of anticipating such a thing according to reason gives us this experience of the certainty of the persistence of the world as the most intimate experience. The sharing of this experience is really the community of the forsaken, which we all are. That is, what we share as the most mundane is the experience whose sense has forsaken us. This obscure experience should be an experience of responsibility. That is, this commonplace and intimate experience, and the community of the principle that we discussed earlier, presuppose each other. They are the very sense of our belonging to each other and what we call the world”; “But, there is nothing outside of philosophy”: An Interview with Shaj Mohan by Rachel Adams, Philosophy World Democracy 2.2 https://www.philosophy-world-democracy.org/but-there-is-nothing-outside 4. 1072b, Aristotle, Metaphysics. 5. There are disagreeable interpretations of this thought of Nietzsche including the Heideggerian one which is closer to the question under Nietzsche’s consideration than that of Deleuze. 6. Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks , William McNeill. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 361. 7. Mohan, Shaj and Divya Dwivedi. 2019. Gandhi and Philosophy: On Theological Anti-Politics , London: Bloomsbury Academic; and Mohan, Shaj and Jean-Luc Nancy. 2020. “Our Mysterious Being” Philosophical salon (April 13), https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/our-mysterious-being/ 8. Jacques Derrida, On the Name , ed.Thomas Dutotit, trans. David Wood, John P. Leavy Jr., and Ian Mcleod. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 89. 9. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World , trans. Jeffrey S. Librett. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 34. 10. Of identity and politics, and identity politics, including fascisms, another time. Related Articles “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” JEAN-LUC NANCY Read Article Nancy's Wager DIVYA DWIVEDI Read Article

JUAN MANUEL GARRIDO WAINER Juan Manuel Garrido is professor of philosophy at the Alberto Hurtado University, Santiago de Chile. Garrido’s research interests include the philosophical concept of life and the philosophy of knowledge production and scientific practice. Among his publications are La formation des formes (Galilée 2008), On Time, Being and Hunger: Challenging the Traditional Way of Thinking Life (Fordham University Press 2012) and Producción de conocimiento (Metales Pesados, 2018).

GAL KIRN Gal Kirn completed his PhD in political philosophy at the University of Nova Gorica. He then worked, among other places, at the Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry and at GWZO in Leipzig, he was a recipient of the fellowship of the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation and at the Akademie Schloss Solitude for the project “Thinking the Monument to Sub/Urban Riots” (together with Niloufar Tajeri). He was a research fellow at TU Dresden, where he researched on Soviet avant-garde and partisan memory. His book Partisan Ruptures appeared at Pluto Press (2019), and his most recent book The Partisan Counter -Archive was published at De Gruyter (June 2020). He is currently a Visiting Professor of Cultural History at University of Nova Gorica. Tito’s No to Schmitt: Against the compatibility of the partisan figures, against the Blut und Boden ideology of populism 21 November 2020 Read Article

MARYAM FARNAM Maryam Farnam is a poet, translator and literary editor and a master graduate of Persian literature and linguistics. Madness and death have a special place in the themes of her poetry. Her work is above all a personal human experience involved with the past and daily life. She is currently working on a long poem with the theme of "madness." Blood-washing (A soldier's heart syndrome) 17 April 2021 Read Article

REX BUTLER Rex Butler is an art historian, writer and Professor (Art History & Theory). His research interests include Australian art and art criticism, Post-War American art and Critical Theory. He is the author or editor of eleven books, including What is Appropriation? (1996), Jean Baudrillard: The Defence of the Real (1999), A Secret History of Australian Art (2002), Slavoj Zizek: Live Theory (2005), Radical Revisionism (2005), Borges' Short Stories: A Reader's Guide (2010) and Deleuze and Guattari's What is Philosophy?: A Reader's Guide (2015). His forthcoming books include UnAustralian Art , with ADS Donaldson, to be published by Power Publishing, University of Sydney, and Stanley Cavell and the Arts , for Bloomsbury Publishing, London. Butler is currently editing two collections, one on the Japanese fashion designer Rei Kawakubo and another on the documentary film-maker Joshua Oppenheimer.

Si la philosophie doit être sauvée pour un autre commencement, elle doit d'abord s'extraire de les racialisations, en particulier de ceux autour desquels l'histoire et la fin de la philosophie de Heidegger et son « travail de réflexion » etaient structrés. Le pari de Nancy DIVYA DWIVEDI 29 July 2021 PHILOSOPHY The Forest in Winter at Sunset , Théodore Rousseau; Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons Si la philosophie doit être sauvée pour un autre commencement, elle doit d'abord s'extraire de les racialisations, en particulier de ceux autour desquels l'histoire et la fin de la philosophie de Heidegger et son « travail de réflexion » etaient structrés. Toute manifestation philosophique sortant du compromis entre « orient » et « occident » sera une anastasis de la philosophie. Vers cela — et alors que nous recevons les trois questions qui sont, en fait, le pari de Nancy — nous devrons saisir à nouveau ce que signifie être dans le « Jüngster Tag » qui doit, bien sûr, être compris comme les dernières heures. Nous sommes dans les jours les plus jeunes de la philosophie. “allons-nous nous tenir face à l’intenable ? Ou bien allons-nous continuer à nous satisfaire de notre pauvre autonomie philosophique ? Ou bien, pourquoi pas, en finir, ayant apporté la preuve (que personne ne demandait) d’une superbe, majestueuse et foisonnante inanité ? ” ( 1 ) Ici il n'y a pas de deuil. Pas de cœur couard, qui ne monte pas jusqu'à la gorge quand 'appellé dans les dernières heures que sonne l’inanité foisonnante. Il rappelle. C'est le cœur de la philosophie qui parle. Le cœur voluptueux de la philosophie — voluptueux ( 2 ) avec la passion de la non-homogénéité, polynomique en étant prêt à être déchiré, à souffrir la ruine ...et l'anastasis. I L'appel de Jean-Luc Nancy, qui s’ouvre par une citation d'un autre (Heidegger) et se clôt par une question à tous les autres que nous sommes et serons — cet appel est une provocation, une exigence, une invitation, un défi. Nous qui sommes nés en ces dernières heures recevons cet appel comme rien de moins qu'un pari, le pari de Nancy . Chaque appel est une ouverture. S'il peut conduire à l'établissement ou à la fondation de quoi que ce soit, il n'a néanmoins aucun pouvoir absolu pour garantir cette fondation de la ruine ou pour bloquer les découvertes des homologies qui s'enfuient dans les ruines. Les poètes le savent, ils ont découvert les appels — d'angoisse, de désir, d'émerveillement — qui attendent dans les mots, qu'ils soient de la vie quotidienne ou d'autres poètes, et ils ont envoyé ces mots « en dehors et à travers » (« hinaus- und hinüberretten » comme le dit Celan dans le poème « Die Schleuse ») changés mais pas épuisés. Et ce pouvoir tourmentant et voluptueux de l'appel, les amoureux de la poésie en sont aussi les intimes, surtout Platon qui l'a distingué par son néologisme mimesis , bien que peu d'entre eux hébergent aujourd'hui le tourment qu'il y a enregistré, tandis que la plupart laissent intact son isolation fonctionnelle dans la famille de l'imitation, de la vraisemblance, du réalisme . Ce tourment était d'abord dans les guillemets qui donnent la parole de l'autre non présent, guillemets qui, pour Platon, sont à l'origine d'une possession par les mots, par l'appel d'un autre - allo-phonie - faisant de nous un être polynomial, capable de devenir le foyer d'autres lois. Ces guillemets s'invisibilisent également dans l'exercice de ce pouvoir, de sorte que d'autres possibilités encore inconnues s'engouffrent dans l'étendue qui commence à s'étirer tout autour des guillemets, s'étendant en dehors et à travers. Et les points d'interrogation — des plus anciens aux plus modernes, en science ou en poésie, socratiques, heideggériens, freudiens, althussériens, ou les questions questionnées par Derrida — sont encore d'autres appels, d’autres ouvertures, d’autres instigations. En citant le titre de 1966 de Heidegger dans le sien, puis en rappelant le drame de la philosophie et de la pensée , Nancy a ouvert un autre théâtre, laissant entendre un autre appel, pour le faire entrer en collision avec ce que Heidegger demandé, mais aussi avec ce que Nancy avait déjà demandé dans ses écrits récents. Quel est l'espace qui s'est ouvert dans ce déploiement de citations où la "tâche" de Heidegger cède la place au pari de Nancy ? Nous recevons ses trois questions à un moment précis que l'on peut caractériser, à la suite de Kant, comme le " Jüngster Tag " qui doit, bien sûr, être compris comme les dernières heures. Nous sommes dans les jours les plus jeunes de la philosophie. Nous sommes également dans les heures de naissance d'un nouvel être, dont la différence spécifique ne peut être indiquée que par le terme "technologique", et qui naît de ce qui était l'homme. Dans ce cas, nous voulons dire que quelque chose est en train de naître pour lequel la philosophie serait devenue trop vieille. Lorsque Heidegger évoquait, encore en 1966, la scène de la philosophie qui s'accomplit en s'éteignant dans l'éclat uniforme de " la compréhension technologique de l'être ", et lorsqu'il indiquait un déplacement complet de l'histoire de la philosophie comme histoire de la métaphysique, c'est-à-dire l'histoire de " l'Occident ", c'est à l'époque d'une vénération accordée à la philosophie. Comme il le dit dans " Qu’appelle-t-on penser " en 1951, " partout l'intérêt pour la philosophie est vif, qu'il se fait entendre toujours plus " et " Les philosophes sont « les » penseurs. Il pouvait mettre en garde contre " philosopher " comme étant, par conséquent, la source de " l'illusion tenace que nous pensons, puisque, après tout, sans relâche nous « philosophons »". ( 3 ) Mais aujourd'hui, le cœur de la philosophie s'adresse à un monde où les départements de philosophie sont déficitaires ou les chercheurs sont priés d'entrer en concurrence avec les entreprises pour obtenir des subventions pour des projets viables — c'est l'ironie aujourd'hui d'être "satisfaits de notre pauvre autonomie philosophique" — tandis que les philosophes qui jouent les taons pour les hommes sur le marché, comme Narendra Dabholkar et Govind Pansare, sont tués sans même un procès de Socrate. Aujourd'hui, ce qui reste de la soi-disant "histoire de la philosophie" est activement oublié derrière son essence industrielle extraite sous forme de "théorie", et c'est maintenant la "pensée" qui est partout assumée comme le titre des activités des entreprises technologiques, de la "science des données", et des rêves d'intelligence artificielle et de messies-machines. pour Heidegger, la privation de l'être qui donne l'occident n'est possible qu'après avoir établi "l'occident" comme un fait, qui comme nous le savons tous est un fait inventé très récemment. Si la " philosophie " est encore un mot qui ne fait que donner une valeur ajoutée à toute cette promotion de la pensée, alors on pourrait dire, dans l'idiome de Heidegger, que partout l'intérêt pour la pensée est vif, et il se fait entendre toujours plus de sorte que nous avons l'illusion tenace que nous philosophons. Alors, la " pensée " aussi, un autre mot de la philosophie (si nous devons continuer à parler comme s'il y avait cette chose unique qu'est la philosophie) devrait être traitée — comme les Abbaus et Destruktions ont traité la philosophie — à un examen — critique ? psychanalyse ? déconstruction ? — avant que nous puissions accueillir ses "tâches". C'est cela, et non pas seulement la "fin de la philosophie", qui constitue la profondeur des cendres sédimentées de la philosophie et de la pensée ; donc, la question " pourquoi pas, en finir" doit-elle être la raillerie amère de ceux qui semblent savoir que c'est déjà fini et qu'il ne reste rien qu'il leur appartienne même de finir. C'est ainsi qu'à l'endroit même où l'essai de Heidegger avait procédé, dans sa deuxième section, à l'esquisse de la figure insaisissable de la " matière de " la pensée, on entend dans le texte de Nancy un refus de s'étendre sur ce qu'est la " pensée ", une réserve pesée, comme un nettoyage du palais pour un autre goût de la philosophie. Au contraire, la " tâche " est ici désignée par l'insistance sur " un sens philosophique " du discours de la philosophie sur sa fin. Et dans cette pause, les mots mêmes de " début " et de "fin" se sont éloignés de Heidegger. Cela donne une autre signification à ce que Nancy, en tant que philosophe du commencement, avait déjà dit : " La philosophie commence d’elle-même ; c'est là pour elle un axiome permanent " ; dans le même texte, il parlait aussi des " Commencements de la philosophie : le mot doit s'écrire au pluriel, car on ne saurait en désigner un seul ". ( 4 ) II Pour commencer, le " commencement " devrait être distingué de l'" origine " en tant que substance qui reçoit les différences qui lui sont tolérables, c'est-à-dire qu'elle reste la même tant que les prédicats se situent dans une certaine gamme. Cela signifie que le commencement doit désormais être distingué, non seulement de l'initial, de l'inaugural et de l'archē, mais surtout de la substantialité d'une " philosophie " qui serait aussi la substantialité de " l'occident " en ayant " son " histoire dans la gamme désignée par Heidegger comme : métaphysique comme ontothéologie comme histoire de l'occident. Cette différence orientale-occidentale est aussi obscure que la "différence ontologique" et est indissociable de celle-ci chez Heidegger, où la première constitue la condition de la seconde. L' occident qu'est la métaphysique est propulsé par la subsistance d'une privation de l'être, qui s'articule comme différence ontologique. Mais cela signifie que pour Heidegger, la privation de l'être qui donne l'Occident n'est possible qu' après avoir établi "l'Occident" comme un fait, qui, comme nous le savons tous, est un fait inventé très récemment. Untitled, William Joseph Kentridge, 1998; Image Credit: MoMA Nancy avait remis en question la pensée de Heidegger sur la philosophie, l'histoire, le destin, les commencements et les fins, en disant que : " Cela revient à confirmer qu'il n'est rien arrivé d'essentiel dans le destin occidental, rien sinon l'aggravation de la métaphysique et son devenir technique et démocratique. ... N'y aurait-il pas eu plus d'une histoire? plus et plus ou autre chose que« une histoire» ? L'historial ne pourrait-il pas être pluriel, égrené le long d'un chemin moins ordonné que celui que cette pensée assigne à l'Occident ?" ( 5 ) La substantialité de "l'est-ouest" est construite à partir des différentes images des Grecs et de la référence à celles-ci en toutes occasions. Par exemple, Heisenberg a jugé nécessaire de se référer au concept de privation d'Aristote pour justifier la coexistence des états en mécanique quantique. De manière beaucoup plus comique, les politiciens indiens ont eux aussi fait ce geste et se réfèrent aux vieilles histoires ou épopées pour essayer de construire une substantialité orientale : on prétend que les avions étaient présents dans l'ancien sous-continent, qu'ils avaient donc Internet ; après tout, les dieux communiquaient entre eux et avec les hommes sur de grandes distances. Nancy nous met en garde : " […] méconnaissant ainsi qu'à partir des Grecs beaucoup est arrivé qui ne provenait pas toujours des Grecs... […]Mais il nous a fallu cette image des Grecs parce que nous ne savons m ne pouvons - ou si difficilement - remonter plus avant. " ( 6 ) Cette construction du " commencement de la philosophie " a formé la condition durable, non pas de la philosophie, mais d'une auto-bio-graphie récente, vieille d'environ trois cents ans, de la philosophie établie dans les textes de certains philosophes. Une auto-bio-graphie qui est aussi, comme elle aurait dû l'être bien plus tôt, arrivée à sa fin. Dans le Jüngster Tag, c'est ce qu'il faut faire de toute urgence : faire le point sur les conditions, et surtout sur ce qu'est la "condition" et sa différence avec l'être, la cause et aussi la raison. Partout où le cœur de la philosophie parle, dans n'importe quelle langue, sous n'importe quel nom, ou sans nom, telle sera sa tâche philosophique. Soulignons, pour l'instant, deux conditions. Premièrement, la différence orientale-occidentale est comme les dieux jumeaux qui sont invoqués dans la métaphore des fleuves jumeaux dans le poème "Der Ister" de Hölderlin (ce n'est pas une surprise, car après Kant et avec Hölderlin, Hegel et d’autres romantiques allemands, la philosophie a commencé sa préoccupation obsédée avec "l'Europe", "l'ouest" et "l'est") : et Füllen gleich In den Zaum knirscht er, et pareil aux poulains À la bride il écume, Der scheinet aber fast Rükwärts zu gehen und Ich mein, er müsse kommen Von Osten. Lui qui paraît pourtant presque Aller à reculons et J’imagine qu’il devrait venir De l’est. ( 7 ) Reprenant les oppositions de "l'Occident et le reste" et de "la philosophie et la pensée" de Heidegger, ces jumeaux ont pris plusieurs avatars : la distinction des domaines de pensée, la distinction des styles et des préoccupations de pensée, les confusions cartographiques, la géo-politique, la techno-militaristique. Ils ont pris ces avatars pour nous détourner de "la fin" en donnant un sens illusoire à nos actions. Deuxièmement, et c'est tout aussi important, cette construction ne s'est pas faite toute seule en Europe. Dans le sous-continent, cette distinction entre l'Orient et l'Occident a été établie à peu près au même moment par les exercices de collaboration des coloniaux et des penseurs des castes supérieures concernant la codification et la distinction des religions et des civilisations de l'Est. Une réciprocité des plus significatives investie dans la différence Occident-Orient est l'adoption et la réinvention de la distinction "Aryen - An-aryen" par les Indologies allemande, britannique et française ; une distinction dont le développement a eu des effets politiques macabres tant dans le sous-continent qu'en Europe. Dans "L’Ister" et "Germanie", Hölderlin voyait dans le Gange et l'Indus les conditions pour concevoir une force originelle (une force qui était et est facilement reconnaissable dans son idiome de pyro-philie comme le feu aryen - une pyro-philie qui a également contesté comme l'autre de la philosophia). Ces conditions ont donné naissance à la "politique des Aryens", qui a eu un effet immédiat sur l'Europe aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles. Leurs contreparties sur le sous-continent étaient la forme nationaliste du "peuple aryen" par laquelle les castes supérieures, en particulier Vivekananda et Gandhi, et tout le spectre de leurs organisations modernes, ont contribué à inventer la religion "hindoue" et son fascisme, qui gouverne l'Inde aujourd'hui. Dans "L'Ister" et "Germania", Hölderlin verrait dans le Gange et l'Indus les conditions pour concevoir une force originelle (une force qui était et est facilement reconnaissable dans son idiome de pyro-philie comme le feu aryen - une pyro-philie qui a également contesté comme l'autre de la philosophia). A peu près au même moment où Heidegger investissait dans la distinction orient-occident en Allemagne, M. K. Gandhi en Inde était engagé dans un projet très similaire. Pour Gandhi, comme pour Heidegger, l'occident marquait un déclin de l'homme malgré ses réalisations techno-scientifiques. Gandhi voyait l'Orient dans tous les endroits où l'homme ne s'écartait pas du naturel. Pour Gandhi, l'occident était la désignation de la déviation du naturel, et donc la désignation de ses apocalypses nécessaires. En 1909, il écrit à propos de l'Occident " cette civilisation est l'irréligion, et elle a pris une telle emprise sur les peuples d'Europe, qui semblent à moitié fous. " " Cette civilisation est telle qu'il suffit d'être patient pour qu'elle s'autodétruise. " ( 8 ) Et lui aussi s'opposait la philosophie ainsi que l'Occident, comme étant satanique, à la bonne pensée, que l'on peut appeler hypophysique . Alors que la métaphysique peut être indiquée par la formule "L'être est X", la pensée hypophysique—dont il existe de nombreux exemples mais qui a été articulée de la manière la plus exhaustive par Gandhi, de tous les penseurs modernes du monde—peut être indiquée par la formule "La nature est la valeur", où la nature est tout ce qui n'est pas fait par l'homme. Les racismes, y compris le racisme métaphysique de Heidegger, et l'ordre des castes du sous-continent sont des espèces d'hypophysique, tout comme certaines affirmations du romantisme allemand. La théorie postcolonialiste (qui associe souvent Gandhi à Heidegger et à de nombreux autres penseurs de l'"Europe", de la "civilisation occidentale" et de la "modernité") et la politique postcolonialiste telles qu'elles sont pratiquées dans le sous-continent ont été une façade pour la politique "aryenne" qui est maintenant en cours dans les œuvres de beaucoup de ceux qui étaient autrefois des post-colonialistes. Ensuite, ce n'est pas du tout dans la seule histoire de la philosophie de Heidegger qu'il faut retracer ces effets politiques des constructions de l'"Europe", de l'"occidental" et de l'"oriental", et du non-occidental de bien d'autres manières. Et, bien sûr, il y a beaucoup d'autres choses qui ont été générées par la différence oriental-occidental, notamment l'arrivée en Europe de l'image libérée du "paria" (terme anglicisé pour "parayar" répandu dans le sud du sous-continent, et emblème de l'intouchabilité et de l'ordre des castes) qui s'oppose maintenant au "parvenu" (d'une manière qui devrait continuer à nous troubler). Ces exemples suffiraient à indiquer que la différence orientale-occidentale a été un travail d'accords réciproques et de chaînes d'imitations de l'un par l'autre, à tel point que, de temps en temps, on s'interroge comme Orwell : " Les créatures à l'extérieur regardaient du cochon à l'homme, et de l'homme au cochon, et du cochon à l'homme à nouveau ; mais déjà il était impossible de dire lequel était lequel. " Mais ce qui est encore plus inquiétant, c'est ce qui est exclu de la gémellité et rendu "non privatif", ou ce qui est laissé comme incapable d'une privation de la pensée concernée. Les peuples et les mondes qui sont tenus pour extérieurs aux divers imaginaires de la différence orientale-occidentale : les peuples d'Afrique, les indigènes des Amériques, les indigènes d'Australie et de Nouvelle-Zélande, les Scandinaves, l'Asie centrale, les Indiens du Sud qu'on appelle les Dravidiens. Et ces peuples peuvent être assimilés aux prédicats de la différence orientale-occidentale, comme certaines études "décoloniales" s'efforcent de le faire, mais pas sans grand risque. Dionysus, Plato or Poseidon? – Bust excavated at the Villa of the Papyri, possibly of any of the three; Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons III Si la philosophie doit rechercher un autre commencement, elle doit d'abord s'extraire de la racialisation, en se débarrassant de ces orientations et occidentations , sous peine de devenir une "théorie blanche". En cela, une autre différence cruciale apparaît entre les deux essais qui portent presque le même nom. Heidegger ne pouvait que commencer son appel à une autre pensée comme "la pensée qui n'est ni métaphysique ni science." Mais Nancy reconnaît aussi bien les dangers de la pensée de Heidegger que ceux de Gandhi, car ce dernière "risque de dissoudre dans l'"océan de la Vérité" l'existence même des hommes et des femmes que cette même "Vérité" devrait éclairer" ; et c'est pourquoi Nancy appelle à "une pensée, voire un monde", qui ne serait "ni métaphysique ni hypophysique." ( 9 ) La philosophie se met, encore et encore, à la recherche de cette pensée, qui est son interminable et irréductible "pour quoi" ou fin—ni fin en tant que disparition destinante et accomplissante, ni fin en tant qu'image du "monde" dans le miroir de l'" ouest "—mais fin en tant que fins , au pluriel, qui attendent leurs naissances et explosions encore inconnues dans la polynomia de toutes choses. C'est ainsi que le pari de Nancy nous parvient, à travers cette seule question parmi les trois qui déclenche une explosion de "fin" et de fins : Allons-nous nous tenir face à l'intenable ? Aucune tâche ou matière [ Sache ] n'est annoncée ici, puisque le sens philosophique est déjà en jeu et recommence avec les commencements et les fins : quelle sorte de fin est " l'intenable " et quelle sorte de commencement prend position ? Comment allons-nous répondre à ce pari ? Nous, dont les conditions, dans la mesure où elles étaient jusqu'à récemment données par la différence ontologique-occidentale-orientale, sont devenues intenables ? Nous devrions nous familiariser avec cette intenabilité : aujourd'hui, la substance récente, l'"orient-occident", a reçu plus de prédicats qu'elle ne pouvait en supporter. Il est en train de devenir quelque chose d'autre , d'une manière analogue à celle de la voiture motorisée qui a reçu plusieurs modifications au cours des dernières décennies - quatre roues motrices, injection de carburant, navigation par satellite, auto-pilotage, etc. En d'autres termes, la voiture s'est transformée en prison. L'éparpillement de toutes les choses maintenues ensemble par la différence confuse entre l'orient et l'occident est apparent. Ainsi, la crise de la différence orient-occident, qui a été évacuée par la substantialité et le concept de substance, a créé une stasis . Les termes et les espaces retenus par cette différence en diverses articulations se libèrent et se dispersent sans autre loi comprénante. La fin, dans ce cas, pourrait être abordée comme une crise avec laquelle la philosophie entretient une relation difficile, surtout aujourd'hui : nous avons déjà dépassé l'âge de la critique, qui a besoin d'intervalles suffisants entre les actions pour les maîtriser. Cet intervalle est quelque chose qui nous manque à l'ère de la vitesse de la lumière. La criticalisation est ce qui est venu prendre la place de la critique. Lorsque les éléments d'un système atteignent leurs limites et se transforment en quelque chose d'autre avec de nouvelles relations fonctionnelles que ce système ne peut plus accommoder à côté des limites des autres éléments, on assiste à une criticalisation . La criticalisation dépasse les pouvoirs de la critique pour définir les limites du système et y ramener ses éléments. La criticalisation conduit à la stasis. Commençons par ces mots de Nancy : "Autrement dit, il faut apprendre à exister sans être et sans destination, à ne rien prétendre commencer ni re-commencer- ni conclure non plus. " ( 10 ) Cela signifie que la philosophie, qui a été isolée fonctionnellement dans la différence "occidental-oriental" récemment, et qui a ensuite souffert de la stasis créée par cette différence, doit venir se tenir en dehors de celle-ci. Anastasis. L'ana-stasis est ce qui vient au-dessus de la stasis. Stasis dérive de la racine spéculative "*sta" qui signifie "tenir en place" ou "tenir ferme". De la même racine est également dérivé le grec ancien "histemi" qui signifie "je me tiens"). La stasis, dans la polis grecque, se produisait lorsque deux factions ou plus prétendaient dicter les lois qui régiraient leur vie commune dans la cité. Un état d'inaction dû à un conflit ou à une guerre civile est également considéré comme une stasis, car dans ce cas, aucune loi n'existe. il appelle à "une pensée, voire un monde", qui ne serait "ni métaphysique ni hypophysique". La philosophie se met, encore et encore, à la recherche de cette pensée, qui est son interminable et irréductible "pour quoi" ou fin.... A notre époque, nous sommes en train de subir la criticalisation de toutes ces conditions—intellectuelles, économiques, environnementales et technologiques—par lesquelles la critique [criticism] et même la critique avaient fonctionné. Anastasis s'empare du système criticalisé afin d'en sauver les homologies, d'accorder aux analogies agitées sans isolations fonctionnelles la passion de la non-homogénéité, et en même temps de laisser un horizon d'inquiétude révéler une gamme de lois comprénantes pour la polynomia active. En effet, comme Gandhi l'a découvert et détesté, Anastasis laisse des ruines. L'anastasis n'est ni la résurrection ni le relèvement des morts, mais " a à voir avec ce que l'anastasis n'est pas ou ne fait pas surgir du soi, du sujet propre, mais de l'autre. " ( 11 ) L'anastasis est le surgissement de l'autre, qui serait pour nous l'autre de la différence oriental-occidental. Mais qu'est-ce qui vient après la vacance de la différence orient-occidentale ? Toute apparition de la philosophie depuis l'extérieur du compromis entre l'orient et l'occident sera une Anastasis de la philosophie. Sans doute, cette possibilité repose maintenant aussi sur les machines - les ordinateurs ; ils donnent les principes à vivre. Nous n'avons pas les conditions pour nous préparer à ce qui pourrait arriver, mais nous devrons découvrir et développer ces nouvelles facultés avec lesquelles le faire. Comme le dirait Derrida, prenez votre temps mais faites vite, car vous ne savez pas ce qui vous attend. ( 12 ) Anastasis est le commencement obscur qui rassemblerait les ruines qui appartenaient à l'occidental comme à l'oriental pour en faire une chrysalide. Et elle déclenchera les imagos qui y sont nées. Ils seront projetés dans de tout autres cieux, avec leurs propres portées, et sans commerce d'orientations et d' occidentations . Nous pourrons écouter leurs échanges si nous sommes capables d'assister à cette fin prochaine de la différence oriental-occidental. Divya Dwivedi, 13 juillet 2021 (Translated by) : Traduit par Enora le Masne de Chermont NOTES 1. Jean-Luc Nancy, "'La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de penser'", Philosophy World Democracy 2.7 (juillet 2021). https://www.philosophy-world-democracy.org/other-beginning/la-fin-de-la-philosophie 2. Voluptueux n'a rien à voir avec la présence. 3. Martin Heidegger, Qu-appelle-t-on penser ? traduit par Gérard Granel. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1973, p. 23, 24. 4. Nancy, La création du monde ou la mondialisation . Paris : Galilée, 2002, p. 105, 119. 5. Nancy, Banalité de Heidegger , Paris : Galilée, 2015, p. 57–58. 6. Ibidem. p. 59. 7. Friedrich Hölderlin, “ L’Ister ”, traduit par François Fédier, in Hölderlin , Paris: L’herne, 1989, p. 31-31 8. M. K. Gandhi, Gandhi : Hind Swaraj and Other Writings , ed. Anthony J. Parel, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 37. 9. Jean-Luc Nancy, Préface à Shaj Mohan et Divya Dwivedi, Gandhi and Philosophy: On Theological Anti-Politic , Londres : Bloomsbury Academic, 2019, p. ix. 10. Nancy, Banalité de Heidegger , p. 85. 11. Nancy, Noli me tangere : On the Raising of the Body , traduit de francais par Sarah Clift, pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Nass, New York : Fordham University Press, 2008, p. 18–19. 12. Derrida, 'L'université sans condition', in Without Alibi . Stanford CA :Stanford University Press, ,2002, p. 237. Related Articles « La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de la pensée » JEAN-LUC NANCY Read Article Et le commencement de la philosophie SHAJ MOHAN Read Article

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DENIZ DURMUS Deniz Durmus is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at John Carroll University. Her research lies at the intersection of feminist philosophies, phenomenology, existentialism, and philosophy of medicine. She has published in academic journals such as Comparative and Continental Philosophy , Simone de Beauvoir Studies , and Philosophies . Sexism in Medicine: Diagnostic Delay and Poor Management of Chronic Illness in Women 6 July 2024 Read Article