What If Our Spectres Were Right-Wing? Post-Revolutionary Transfigurations in Pan-Demic Hatred
6 July 2022
Djelekovec rebellion, Ivan Generalic, 1936; Image Credit: Wikiart
Natalia Romé’s text raises unique and authentic questions that occupy every intelligent and clear mind: Has rebellion become a right-wing image? Are young people right-wing? Is our future a right-wing one? Looking through the non-democratic tendencies we see in our global, regional and national situations, she argues that all we have for now a weak opportunity and great risks, because the socialization of fear can provoke inexplicable alliances, for example, of a part of the popular sectors with capital forces.
“I didn’t come to lead lambs. I am here to wake up lions (...) Why are you so afraid of freedom?” declares a legislative Argentinian candidate who promises to “kick out the political elite” and closes his speech with the rock entitled “Here it comes” (the rebellion), associated with the 2001’s riots. (1)
Which conditions made possible the conformation of a right-wing Jacobinism that manages to cross, at every step, the borders of what is thinkable and what can be said? By what means is a language of inequality modulated as a project for the future? In which mechanisms of discomfort could be rooted the elimination of the other as a proper metaphor for well-being? And, finally, how can this condensation raise any contesting image or any of its utopian reverberations? Has rebellion become a right-wing image? Are young people right-wing? Is our future a right-wing one?
We tell ourselves that the problem is neoliberalism. We are aware of David Harvey’s theses that read in the history of neoliberalization an economic and political class project associated with the reversion of the so-called Social State. (2) We know that part of this project was consolidated through the transformation, since the mid-1950s, of research and education centers, modifying scientific agendas and theoretical canons. And later on, by creating foundations and think-tanks, transforming the very figure of the critical intellectual, based on a set of technologies of the entrepreneurship of the self, the bureaucratization of intellectual work, productivity criteria, etc. We have even carefully followed Nancy Fraser’s thesis when she identifies the forms of a left neoliberalism as a condition of the neoliberal hegemonic bloc. (3)
But this historical bloc only briefly enjoyed the sweetness of the promised ‘Information Society’ utopianism. A few years after the proclamation of the ‘end of history,’ Latin America began a new phase of popular mobilizations that could connect Chiapas with Caracas, the Bolivian highlands and Argentine Patagonia. However, since the financial crisis of 2008, the ideological instability of so-called neoliberalism does not seem to find a catalyst: the experience of permanent uncertainty has thus become the new norm and apocalypse has become an even comforting form of fantasy. Forty years later, the world that was consolidated with the collapse of the Berlin Wall continues to agonize, but the dispute for its posterity or its overcoming has not yet found a democratic political translation capable of composing a popular counter-power on a global scale.
In some recent texts, Álvaro García Linera (4) identifies an abatement of the predictive horizon of neoliberal society in which he recognizes a significant divergence of the elites. The ideological bloc of late capitalism appears to be under tension from within, fragmented: “The dominant ‘great neoliberal consensus’ of the last forty years begins to collapse. It is a new ‘death of the gods’ that leaves a feeling of desolation and abandonment.” Now, that the ‘free market’ is eclipsing in the face of divergent dominant elites regarding how to deal with uncertainty -he continues-, an intense struggle has been triggered among them: some of them more globalist, others more protectionist, some more libertarian, others more progressive and egalitarian, all of them capable of gaining access to State power, in addition to those popular sectors that want to democratize property and wealth, the sacred and untouchable core of the neo-liberal consensus. Thus, for the fossilized neoliberals or neo-protectionist conservatives, democracy has now become not only a burden, but a danger – Linera states –, and against this, a fascistized neoliberalism is emerging in the world.
Undoubtedly, the pandemic only reinforced these already existing ideological tendencies. If we think about the etymology of the word pan-demic, we find no trace of the disease there, but instead we find totality (pan) and demos. How does this word permeate our social experience? What genealogies are reinscribed in the pan-demic fear? What does it say about the non-democratic tendencies we see in our global, regional and national situations? There is a weak opportunity and great risks, because the socialization of fear can provoke inexplicable alliances, for example, of a part of the popular sectors with capital forces.
It is worth remembering, here, that the moment of global expansion of neoliberalism began in South America, in Argentina governed by a military dictatorship under Jorge Rafael Videla and in Chile under Augusto Pinochet. In these countries the alliances that gave rise to the historical neoliberal bloc were never soft or homogeneous, but the effect of long-term native solidarities of supposedly modernizing, economically liberal and anti-popular tendencies, with ultra-conservative, racist, colonialist and patriarchal forces. In this context, then, it does not seem strategic to ignore the fact that, once its stages of maniacal utopianism have fallen, a sector of the global right itself has been producing forms detracting from the so-called globalization and, far from occupying the place of apprehension, takes the vanguard with the appropriation of the political protest.
In order to pose this question with a certain materialistic rigor, it is necessary to note that the ideological struggle does not exclusively concern the content of the discourses, but instead is ciphered in their form. It is at the level of the form of discourse that we can read the inherence of politics in its history. And it is necessary to note that today a battle is being waged in the very form of political discourses, a battle that can be seen in the way in which the right-wing surprises us with expressions, clichés and enunciative strategies that take up the discursive tradition of the left wing.
Like a game of spies and mirrors, the places, the substitutions, the masks are unfolded. The right wing does not only seem to dispute among itself the leadership space but also that of popular sensibilities. This is what we read in the expressions of various voices of the right, such as Agustín Laje (5), a young intellectual who combines a systematic presence in social networks with an academic career linked to various institutions and think-tanks manifestly conservative:
So many decades of resounding electoral failures; of workers’ indifference; of cardboard revolutions that do not even tickle power, led by women with hairy underarms on the one hand, and by “women with penises” on the other. […] No wonder, then, that the possibility of a territorially unlimited enlightened despotism excites the political moods of the left: who else would have the right to rule the world in such a situation, if not themselves, heirs of the Enlightenment, blessed “know-it-alls,” masters of all knowledge? And have they not already effectively occupied to a large extent the power of those black boxes we call international organizations, in their capacity as “experts”? […] But if globalism entails the radical negation of the sovereign right of nations, patriotism stands ready to offer combat. (6) (Trans. N. R.)
A pseudo right-wing globaliphobic plebeianism or cualunquism attributes the decline of the world born in the heat of the Cold War to a supposed hegemony of the left. This conspiratorial mode of politics, that gathers in its field the tactics of provocation, simulation, unfolding and role reversal is that one opened after the so-called 11S – suggests the Argentinian sociologist Horacio González. (7) The current proliferation of conspiracy theories seems to symptomize the frustrating decline of the globalist utopia, in the form of a decline in the symbolic frameworks of modern politics. A sort of impoverishment of its internal dialectics to the benefit of its phantasmatic and ominous components.
Now, that the technocratic matrix of global governance shows its imposture, we come to learn that the globalist technocracy, with its legal and financial logic, used to be of the ‘left.’ Well, that is news! It even provokes laughter. But the matter is serious. Conspiracy “is nothing other than an inner degree of the political being. Its exact denied and necessary reverse, its unpronounced name” – says González. (8) Spectres, ghosts, masks and therefore transfigurations constitute an inherent dimension of political life, the trace of the transferential and affective background of all power relations. In this sense, Michel Pêcheux questioned himself in the 1980s: “Can abstractions such as ‘the people,’ ‘the masses,’ ‘the proletariat,’ ‘the class struggle’ be represented (painted, filmed or televised) in a state of concepts without transfiguration (travestissement)? And is the same not true of the Freudian unconscious?” (9) The concrete efficacy of abstractions, inscribed in the very exercise of any language, is marked precisely by the displacements and transfigurations (travestissement) that affect the representation of a revolutionary process for its own actors – he stated.
Pêcheux’s remarks allow us to understand that arguments such as Laje’s, which we read above, may certainly be baroque or even bizarre from the point of view of the social sciences or history; nevertheless, they are highly concrete, credible and, especially, experiential for broad sectors whose survival conditions have become in themselves as absurd and inexplicable as the reality of not having access to potable water when living in an urban center, in conditions of a global pandemic. When material conditions embrace the absurdity of an unlivable life, all theoretical forms of indolence – whatever the reasons – fall into the sack of imposture. In that context, those that can touch something of the experience of injustice succeed to occupy the place of the true, beyond the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their contents. As in an incessant game of mirrors, the literal becomes the hidden and the hidden is hidden through the procedure of not hiding anything. The politics of conspiracy thus touches the core of the real:
What is VOX? A movement of extreme necessity that was born to put the institutions into the service of the Spanish people, in contrast to the current model that puts Spanish people to serve the politicians. VOX is the party of common sense, the one that gives voice to what millions of Spanish people think in their homes; the only one that fights against the suffocating political correctness. In VOX we do not tell Spanish people how to think, speak or feel, we tell the media and the parties to stop imposing their beliefs on society. Our project can be summarized in the defense of Spain, the family and life; in reducing the size of the State, guaranteeing equality among Spanish people and expelling the Government from your private life. We are the Spain that does not need to look at polls or read a newspaper to know what is the fashionable discourse. Our discourse is born of our convictions, regardless of whether they are more or less popular. In short, VOX is the party of the living, free and brave Spain. (10)
It is the right that seems to be capturing the true point of the discontent, with its amoral language, its anti-intellectualism, its capacity to challenge the political correctness with which the bureaucratizing forms of neoliberal normativism captured the belligerent and polemic language of emancipatory politics. Curious transfiguration, the left no longer wonders for the sublime but for the ‘realistic.’ It is the right-wing ‘critique’ that offers itself with a singularly sensitive capacity to capture fury, disappointment, weariness, while the left repeats its wooden tongue.
This question is never merely electoral, but it is nevertheless significant that the pronouncement of ‘criticism’ is quickly accompanied by a political program:
The world will be forced to choose between two forms of populism: that of the right or that of the left. The center is disappearing, that’s a fact. So, if you're going to have to accommodate your investment strategy to the fact that you have to care about ordinary people, it seems obvious which way to go. Otherwise, you're going to have Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, the Chavez’s, Allende’s and Castro’s of this world and we’ve seen what left-wing populism does […]. What workers want is an honest day’s pay for an honest day’s work, not a government transfer. […] Additionally, they want access to capital to develop enterprises. This populist movement is about making everyone a capitalist, i. e., pro-market... (11)
We tell ourselves that the problem is the post-truth but, in spite of the neologism, we imagine it as a ‘false consciousness’ that could be awakened by pulling back some communicational veil, wielding the true data or exposing the swindle. However, there is no deception in the promise of the ideologeme of the so-called ‘Information Society’ and this is what is truly disturbing.
To approach the question of ideological domination – and struggle – with materialist rigor requires addressing not only the form of discourses but also the material devices, rituals and technologies of communication in terms of their artifactuality.
The utopia of information offers what is found on its surface: a plot whose components are immediately information, transparent communicability, registration of minimal impulses, muscular mechanisms of the hands when typing, seconds of viewing; in short, bits, genetic data, etc. There is no deception, the communicational artifact does not hide anything from the object to the subject, it only shows too much: it avoids emptiness, it forbids the metaphor or the gap that makes a subject appear as the illusion of sovereignty. There is no ‘the People’ in the social networks and, nevertheless, it is heard as a mantra that if there is a political disconnection with the popular sensibilities, that if the interpellations do not work, if the affective games of enthusiasm and identification are weakened, ‘the problem is communications strategy’.
Furthermore, there is no ‘the People’ in the opinion polls either. ‘Outside’ the networks, for years, many years before their massification, in the ‘face-to-face’ world, the language of the networks has been spoken, and especially, the fallacy of a non-listening has been practiced, which fattens a foolish (or cruel) version of democratization as a new proceduralism, based on full communicability. We can called it demoscopic democracy – Sergio Caletti (12) suggests – a polyarchic practice dedicated to collect humorous positions facing the things of life, as things that become visible and according to the formats under which they are presented to us by a predominantly mass-mediatic or telecommunications scene.
It is not only a game of images that links the technical interrogation by survey for managers and technicians with the interrogation that intimidates or kills for the so-called security agencies. One and the other scavenging configure, strictly speaking, different genres of policing. […] This detail about the roles played is interesting. Everything indicates that, in the end, someone has to tell those who govern what is going on down there. In the old version, the so-called intelligence services had to find out the secrets hidden among the voices that thundered. In the modality that is gaining space, on the other hand, the rummaging is done on the surface of the silences. […] It happens that the rummaging, which has nothing to do with listening, cancels the speaking. The words that are uttered as a consequence of this rummaging can never, in the end, suppose the opportunity to inaugurate worlds, to imagine horizons… (13)
Vain communicology researches, sociometry and social psychology strategies waste their efforts to understand the phenomenon of a right-wing that speaks a left-wing language or of popular sectors that speak a right-wing language, they waste their efforts by not asking themselves, or worse, by taking for granted that the questions about the historical conditions of the present scene have been answered.
What are the questions that are missing from our democratizing vocation, the ones we do not want or cannot ask ourselves?
We know, because we have tirelessly repeated it to ourselves, that the present scene is the effect of a defeat, of a loss that is not only that of the concept of revolution, but even that of the memory that its faded name embodies “that disappearance would imply the sense of history gone astray. An experience similar to that suffered anguishingly from the ancient believing faith and that a part of the baroque time exposed: the counter-absolute, the nothingness. A post-history.” (14) (Trans. N. R.)
According to Michel Pêcheux (15), since the feudal monarchy of the eighteenth century, changes of form and topological upheavals have affected the work of the ‘non-existent’ and the ‘unrealized’ in revolutionary discourse, giving a singular course to the work of the ideological. The initial overlapping of two worlds, materially separated by stable and visible borders, gave way with the Bourgeois Revolution to the internal division of a single universe traversed by an unstable and subtle border, whose invisibility guarantees its efficacy. Heir to the same universal figure of Revolution, the irruption of October 17 had the strangely contradictory historical result – warns Pêcheux – of accentuating to its ultimate limit the invisibility of the borders put into play by the class struggle while simultaneously producing other borders whose power of containment, stability and visibility did not cease to increase, in that type of State officially atheist but where the religious effects constantly returned, in a secularized form. This ‘religious effect’ insists and endures, according to Pêcheux, when criticism forgets that dominated ideologies are formed under and against ideological domination, and not in an ‘underworld’ (arrière-monde), previous, external or independent. (16)
Contemporary leftist discourses are trapped to such an extent in the religious logic of borders which Pêcheux warns about, that they sometimes lead to a logic of paranoid interpretation: the religious administration of meaning managed by spokespersons in the space without remainder of a symmetrical antagonism, which avoids any internal heterogeneity or overdetermination.
He noticed in the early 1980s that the epoch of revolutionary discourse condensed in the logical form of an inversion was also the epoch of the exhaustion of the internal spring of this discourse. And so, he warned with concern that the antagonistic logic on which the political strategy of a specular inversion of the adversary’s discourses was based was closing in on itself. The very form of its discourses threatened the possibility of opening up to the unpredictable resistances and revolts that “burn beneath the devices and programs.”
Nowadays, forty years later, we can wonder if our opinion polling agencies and political speech strategists aren’t the inheritors of Cold War ideological polices. If the discourses with leftist pretensions of our time persist in this obstinacy of not listening to the displacements that function under their own strategic logic, it would not be the first time that the ruling class gets ahead of its adversaries by understanding that which resistances and revolts displace in the established order, in order to take political advantage of it.
Nazism will probably never again occur as such, but “the womb remains fertile,” and gives birth every day to more effective means of mastering what resists it: the “wind tongues” have been considerably perfected since the 1930s in the art of anesthesia and asphyxiation. From the medium in trance who became visible through his voice in radio Germany in 1933, to the audiovisual spectrum of contemporary media, what progress in the art of making the masses walk, producing the invisible for them! The efficacy of these transfigurations (travestissement) is that “the masses” remain there as invisible to themselves, as unrepresentable as concepts. And this spectral phantasmagoria works so well, apparently, that some thinkers go so far as to claim that the real is only a decoy, a network of simulacra, a self-produced discourse of seduction... (17)
It is necessary to explore the rigorously material diapositives and modes or procedures of this defeat in leftist discursive imagination beyond the figures of simulation, subtraction or silencing. It is necessary to interrogate the productive history of political discourses, the genealogy of their torsion on the way to the survival of ‘revolutionary’ adages without revolution. But, of course, this search promises the unpleasantness of a discovery that overflows the shelves of leftist memory and comes shamelessly to tell us more than what we want to know, about the political fragility of our current progressive, ‘emancipatory,’ ‘leftist’ or ‘national-popular’ dispositions. Because as César González states, the very moment in which the lower classes choose to speak out, they are already awaited by a host of technocrats anxious to give them the inventory allowed for their recent disobedience. “Everything they can claim is marked with a cross in a multiple-choice designed far away from their experiences. These are sectors that are kept on the margins of symbols, due to an innate underestimation by society’s accredited scholars, who can never see them as possible producers of new meanings.” (18) (Trans. N. R.)
Political correctness, affirms Žižek, stages a strange racist version of hatred of otherness and of the perception of the other as an enemy that threatens our way of life. Indulgence to violent practices from subaltern sectors is always revealing of a leftist segregationist guilt: “We are to be condemned, the other to be understood; our domain is that of morality (moral condemnation) the other’s is sociology (social explanation). In the form of extreme self-blame and self-abasement, this posture, resulting from a true ethical masochism, repeats the formula of racism.” (19)
In a similar way Jacques-Alain Miller explains racism as an expanded ominous reverse of Humanism, where the crisis of traditional communities and of the consolidated religious discursive formations that incarnated the function of meta-language and regulation of jouissance, translates into experiences of disintegration of the ego itself on account of another imaginary or abstract law. The encounter with whatever of the other that offers itself as a frustrating limit to the effort of comprehension becomes a threat of dissolution. And hence the point at which the calls for tolerance, the celebrations of multiculturalism or the exaltations to live a ‘world without borders’ fail is not in the fact that one cannot recognize oneself in the Other as a subject of science, but to recognize oneself as a ‘subject of jouissance.’ Hence the apparent paradox of a reactive disposition: “When the Other comes too close, it mixes with you, as Lacan says, and there are thus new phantasms that fall upon the excess of the Other's jouissance.” (20) (Trans. N. R.)
Nor is it insufficient to attribute the translation and technological diffusion of a set of radicalized and absurd ideas to global-scale ideological design power agencies; it is also suspiciously reassuring and self-indulgent. “Is it not evident that this model of attribution is typical of espionage work?”, wondered Horacio González. (21)
The coexistence of discursive forms of political correctness, polling technologies and political marketing strategies constitute concrete material conditions for the unwitting participation of the left in the expansion of segregationism.
The question of the dominant ideology is not a question of the sociometry of opinions; it has no ‘population segment’ but concerns the commons of a society. The dominant ideology is so because it speaks to everyone and to each of us. Nor is the question of ideology only restricted to the question of discourses, their configuration, conflict, distribution or attribution; it is a question of that which exceeds them, in the sense that it points to what is ciphered in them as the articulation of material regimes of the symbolic-imaginary with a psychic and affective or libidinal economy.
In what way do we believe? This is the question that the concept of ideology seeks to address by pointing ‘beyond’ and ‘closer’ than discursive materiality. Ideology explores the springs of the sacred in discourses, because there is no discourse really spoken by human beings that can be completely separated from the conditions of possibility that haunt it like spectres. And therein we find the incumbency of the question of the ideological when it comes to politics in a strong sense, because certain abstractions – those that seek to name the force of a singularity in real history – , abstractions such as “the people,” “the masses,” “the proletariat,” cannot “be represented (painted, filmed or televised) in a state of concepts without transfiguration (travestissement).” (22)
There is no falsehood in transfiguration. There is no fraud or deception. It is the inadequacy of the political name that sustains the believing and transferential affective force of its potency.
To put it bluntly, it is not only that a singular name for a political subject inevitably presents itself transfigured, but its singular efficacy lies precisely in that effect of metaphorization, its singular mode of being in another. It is there that the order of representation (semiotic and political) is tied to the order of belief. It is that ‘surplus’ that resists linguistic formalization, that ‘remainder,’ that sustains the historical and singular – i. e. subjective – efficacy of beliefs. And it does so to the same extent that it perseveres in the irreducible ambivalence that hinders its fixation to a signifier.
“Conspiracies in their larval state specialize in blurred gestures, laborious feints, barely insinuated signs that perhaps fatigue the conspirators themselves” are “misty movements, written in the sand.” (23) Conspiration has its ominous mode: “provocation is a whole art of substitution, a crisp form of the theater of politics, itself obscurely theatrical.” And it has also its desire mode: “If conspiracy is somehow the distrust in the secret kept by others, it can be assailed by the question of the mythical time when the relations of common life were not governed by that distrust.” (24) The conspiracy – the unconfessable reversal of the political being – is subtended by the ever-present nostalgic remainder of the conciliatory friendship lost in a mythical or uncertain time of the formless.
The “ungraspable, mutant, protean matter” of metamorphosis is a “miracle of language,” says González. “It is the thought of the larva, which means phantom in Latin. It is a master hypothesis about nature as seen by the worm.” It is the realm of mythology. (25)
Then, is right-wing ‘rebellion’ either politicization or simulacrum? Desire or provocation? Phantom or fantasy? Conspiration or metamorphosis? If it is not the denunciation of ‘falsification’ that belongs to the critique of the dominant ideology – even less to its political combat – what can be said of the appropriation of combative tropos, the indignant intonations, the disposition to suspicion by reactionary forces?
The problem, the real problem, is not that of detecting and denouncing an inauthenticity, but that of courageously assuming the question regarding the historical and subjective conditions of emergence of this singular mode of displacement and transfiguration, where it concerns us. For if these conditions testify to a dominant ideology, it is necessary to understand this dominance as the effect of a contradictory unity. An ideology is dominant, precisely, because it cuts through that which is believed to be ‘antagonistic,’ ‘subaltern’ or ‘alternative.’ Its efficacy does not lie in the pure square of the signifier, but summons the affective strands that sustain a hermeneutic community in its common senses, ‘beyond’ the differences.
What if the evidence of a ‘right-wing rebelliousness’ metaphorized that of a right-wing youth, ergo, an inescapable right-wing future? What if this was our dominant ideology or the eschatology of our time? The perplexity of the realization offers a rare chill that seems to connect with the sweet unhappiness of fascination with the ominous. Not only ‘the networks’ or ‘the media’ but also the sciences, the philosophy and politics seem today to secretly love the phenomenon of a revolting and contesting right wing. Traces of lascivious materiality in the scandalized intonations, hints of morbidity in the progressive faces and a certain taste for scandal among the leftists, are enough marks to perceive that what looms in the new figures of the monstrous sinks its roots in much deeper grounds than those of a conjunctural confrontation of global political forces. Between fascinated excitement and self-indulgent dispensation of responsibility, the wide region of sensibilities that do not identify themselves with the hyperbolic modulations of the ‘rebel’ right remains strangely paralyzed (and darkly eroticized) when facing what seems to be presented to them as the sublime order of the inexorable.
1. “Se viene el estallido / Se viene el estallido / De mi guitarra / De tu gobierno también... / Y si te viene alguna duda / Veni agarrala que esta dura / Si esto no es una dictadura / ¿Que es, que es.?” (The explosion is coming / The outburst is coming / of my guitar / Of your government too... / And if you have any doubts / Come and get it, it’s hard / If this is not a dictatorship / What is it, what is it?)
2. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Oxford UP, 2005.
3. Nancy Fraser, The Old is Dying and the New Cannot Be Born: From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump and Beyond. Verso, 2017.
4. Álvaro García Linera, “Tiempo histórico liminal.” JacobinAmérica Latina, 5 January 2021, https://jacobinlat.com/2021/01/05/tiempo-historico-liminal/. Accessed 30 November 2021.
5. Laje is the author of some titles, among them, El libro negro de la nueva izquierda: ideología de género o subversión cultural (2016) and among other antecedents he has received a scholarship to study counterterrorism at the William J. Perry Center of the National Defense University, in Washington DC.
6. Agustín Laje, “Globalismo y patriotismo en tiempos de pandemia.” Fundación Civismo 45 (2020), https://civismo.org/es/globalismo-y-patriotismo-en-tiempos-de-pandemia/. Accessed 24 November 2021.
7. Horacio González, Filosofía de la Conspiración, Marxistas, peronistas y carbonarios. Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2004, p. 69.
8. González, Filosofía de la Conspiración, p. 69
9. Michel Pêcheux, “Délimitations, retournements et déplacements.” L Homme et la société 63–64 (1982): p. 53–69.
10. “Qué es VOX?” Vox official website, https://www.voxespana.es/espana/que-es-vox. Accessed 24 November 2021.
11. Axel Kaiser, “El mundo tendrá que elegir entre populismo de derecha o izquierda.” Entrevista a Stephen Bannon. El Tiempo, 17 November 2018, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/entrevista-con-steve-bannon-sobre-el-populismo-y-el-gobierno-de-donald-trump-294662. Accessed 24 November 2021.
12. Sergio Caletti, “La cuestión de la opinión pública. (y otros debates de hoy).” Avatares de la comunicación y la cultura 11 (June 2016), https://publicaciones.sociales.uba.ar/index.php/avatares/article/view/4853/3986. Accessed 30 November 2021.
13. Sergio Caletti, “Decir, autorrepresentación, sujetos. Tres notas para un debate sobre política y comunicación.” Versión 17 (2006): 19–78, https://versionojs.xoc.uam.mx/index.php/version/article/view/259/258. Accessed 30 November 2021.
14. Nicolás Casullo, Las cuestiones. México: FCE, 2007.
15. Michel Pêcheux, “Délimitations, retournements et déplacements.”
16. Pêcheux, “Délimitations, retournements et déplacements.”
17. Pêcheux, “Délimitations, retournements et déplacements.”
18. César González, El fetichismo de la marginalidad. Buenos Aires: Sudestada, 2020.
19. Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes. London: Verso, 2017, 26.
20. Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimidad. Los cursos psicoanalíticos de Jacques-Alain Miller. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2010.
21. González, Filosofía de la Conspiración, p. 117.
22. Pêcheux, “Délimitations, retournements et déplacements.”
23. González, Filosofía de la Conspiración, p. 70.
24. González, Filosofía de la Conspiración, p. 76.
25. Horacio González, La crisálida. Metamorfosis y dialéctica. Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2005, p. 18–19.